
1. **Bargaining and Gender relations: within and beyond household by Bina Agarwal (2011)**

* Unitary hh model assumes that hh members seeks to max utility on the basis of a set of common preferences represented by an aggregate utility function and a common budget constraint
* Intra hh dynamics are assumed to exist in islocation, without examining the extra hh socio-economic and legal institutions within which hh are embedded
* A member’s bargaining power would be defined by a range of factors, in particular the strength of the person’s fall-back position (the outside options which determine how well-off she/he would be if cooperation failed), also termed as the “threat point.” An improvement in the person’s fall-back position (better outside options) would lead to an improvement in the deal the person gets within the household.
* Hh are constituted of multiple actors, with varying preferences and interests and differential abilities to pursue those interests
* A bargaining model would suggest that policies and resources be directed differently, insofar as the welfare, efficiency and equity implications could differ by gender
* Factors responsible for a person’s bargaining strength within the family:
* Control over assets
* Access to employment
* Access to communal resources
* Access to social support systems
* Support from NGOs
* Support from state
* Social perceptions
* Social norms
* The greater a person’s ability to survive outside the family, the greater would be his bargaining power over subsistence within the family
* Gender differences in intra hh bargaining power are thus linked with the person’s extra hh bargaining power, such as with the community and the state
* In cultures where social normas stifle explicit bargaining/voice, women may be pushed to using implicit forms of contestation
* The outcome of bargaining with be less favorable to a person who attaches less value to his own well being relative to the well being of others
* But altruism too can affect bargaining outcomes. The question is: are women more altruistic than men? At one level, some of women’s actions within families appear to support this view. Second, with limited outside options, women might well seek to maxi- mize “family” welfare because it is in their long-term self-interest (even if it reduces their immediate well-being), insofar as women are more dependent on the family for their survival than are men. when read in the light of prevailing male advantage in labor markets and property rights, of women’s need for male mediation in the community, and of their dependence on sons in widowhood or old age.
* One, women are often excluded from (or severely under-represented in) public decision-making bodies which enforce and modify the rules governing the community. Two, a woman’s typically weaker intra-household bargaining power would also weaken her extra- household bargaining power (compared with men), if her husband and marital family oppose her stand. Three, where patrilocal, inter-village marriages with nonkin are the norm, married women would not have the support of kin coalitions that men have within the village.
* In general, women’s bargaining power within the community would be enhanced if they operate as a group rather than as individuals.

1. **An Experimental Measure of Bargaining Power Within Couples by Denis Beninger and Miriam Beblo (2016)**

* According to bargaining models of the household, in-couple resource allocation is driven by the partners’ individual bargaining power, represented by the intra-household sharing rule equation
* This rule is typically defined as a function of individual incomes, socio-economic characteristics, and distribution factors, determined e.g. by marriage market institutions such as sex ratios or legislation influencing the division of marital goods upon divorce
* The sharing between spouses is identified through individual expenditures of a limited set of private goods and the income variation among households. Partner-specific income effects are thus still difficult to determine precisely.
* The only way to guarantee the necessary ceteris paribus environment is through an experimental approach with random assignment of non-labor income to different decision-makers in the household and a comparison of the household’s resulting consumption choices
* First, the participants make their decisions in a controlled environment. Hence, we observe the complete individual and joint consumption patterns. So we record the choice of each spouse separately, as well as the joint decision of the couple. Secondly, we observe the potential changes in couples’ decisions when the resource allocation between spouses varies, while total household allocation remains the same. Thus, we can directly derive an index for the relative bargaining power within the household (i.e. the sharing rule in the collective setting) depending on relative resource allocation, without imposing behavioral restrictions such as caring preferences or egoism. Third, we can identify the determinants of the bargaining power index by use of socio-economic, division, and behavioral characteristics of the couples collected in a separate questionnaire after the experiment.
* The aim of this first consumption task was to reveal the participants’ individual preferences, without interference from the partner. In the second step, the couples had to agree on joint consumption decisions. We are mostly interested in the deviations of the couples’ decisions from the respective individual choices across rounds.
* The couple’s decision is thus, on average, always closer to the female’s preferences than to the male’s. In our experiment, women seem to have a higher bargaining power regarding expenditures for private good bundles, although the female and male distances do not remain significantly different (at the 10% level) when men receive more resources than women.
* The variation of the female relative bargaining power with the female relative resource allocation is further investigated conditional on various background characteristics of the couple. The main variable of interest is the relative allocation. The estimation results in Table 3 confirm that the female bargaining power increases significantly with the woman’s relative resource allocation.
* To examine further factors determining the female power index, we exploit rarely available information on intra-couple behavior and attitudes collected in the post- experimental questionnaire. We include the participants’ responses to questions on self-assessed selfishness, traditional values, and attractiveness. selfless women have significantly more bargaining power. The female self-rated attractiveness significantly increases her bargaining power, independently from the attractiveness of her partner.

1. **Limited Insurance within the Household: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Kenya by Jonathan Robinson (2012)**

* This paper presents results from a field experiment in Kenya designed to directly test whether intra-household risk-sharing arrangements offer full insurance. The experiment followed 142 married couples for 8 weeks. Every week, each individual had a 50 percent chance of receiving a 150 Kenyan shilling (KS) (US $2.14) income shock, equivalent to roughly 1.5 days’ income for men and 1 week’s income for women. Information about the shocks was public knowledge—both spouses were told what their partner received
* The empirical approach is based on the assumption that, even though men and women may have very different preferences, the experimental shocks are too small (relative to lifetime income) to affect intra-household bargaining power.
* An important disadvantage of the study, which is important to acknowledge, is that (for ethical and practical reasons) the income shocks provided were always positive, unlike real-world shocks, which can of course be either positive or nega- tive. Thus, it’s possible that people may have treated these payments as “windfall” income.
* husbands increase their expendi- tures on privately consumed goods in weeks in which they receive the shock but do not change their expenditures in weeks in which their wives do, a rejection of Pareto efficiency. I do not detect statistically significant responses to either type of shock for women. These general results are robust to examining changes over several weeks rather than to just the week in which the shock was received. Note also that since the experimental shocks are fully observable by both spouses, behavior cannot be attributed to information asymmetries

1. **Spousal Control and Intra-Household Decision Making: An Experimental Study in the Philippines by Nava Ashraf (2009)**

* Household savings and investment are significantly affected by how decision-making power is allocated between women and men. In particular, when intra-household financial decisions are made by women, savings and investment are often greater and repayment of debt is more likely
* Understanding how spouses adjust strategically when information about their income and subsequent financial decisions is private, or when elements of the bargaining process (such as communication) change, is important to under- standing household decision outcomes— but requires exogenous variation to identify.
* experiments were explicitly designed not to treat households as a unit, but to allow for as much individual decision making as possible while varying the degree of privacy of information and ability to bargain.
* In the first condition, private information without pre-play communication (denoted “Private”), subjects are separated from their spouses at the onset of the experiment. They do not know what the spouse is doing, whether the spouse has received any income, what decisions the spouse is making, or what outcomes he/she receives; as much information as is possible is kept private from the spouse. In the second condition, public information without pre-play communication (“Public”), subjects and their spouses enter the room together. They learn about their own and each other’s payoffs and choice sets, and make simultaneous decisions; however, they cannot communicate or see the decisions the other is making until after their decisions have been made. In the third condition, public information with pre-play communication (“Negotiation”), subjects and their spouses follow the same procedure as Public, but they communicate before making their decisions, and their decisions are immediately observable to each other.
* I find that men are more likely to deposit the money into their own account in Private and commit it to consumption in Public, and that this effect is mainly driven by men whose wives make the savings decisions in the household. Although initially it does not appear that women exhibit such behavior, women whose husbands control the savings decisions in the household behave as the men whose wives control the savings decisions. Finally, men are more likely to turn their money over to their spouse’s account in the Negotiation condition, an effect that is greater for men who do not control the savings decisions in their household. Women whose husbands control the savings decisions in their household are also more likely to turn money over to their spouse’s account.
* My results suggest that husbands and wives respond strategically to changes in information and communication, but what initially looks like differences in response by gender appears to be driven by underlying household control structures that create incentives to change behavior in face of changes in monitoring
* The experiments were run with 146 married couples in the conference rooms of Green Bank, a rural private bank in Mindanao, the Philippines. The subject pool was drawn from former and existing clients of Green Bank and their spouses.
* When choices are private, men put money into their personal accounts. When choices are observable, men commit money to consumption for their own benefit. When required to communicate, men put money into their wives’ account. These strong treatment effects on men, but not women, appear related more to control than to gender: men whose wives control household savings respond more strongly to the treatment and women whose husbands control savings exhibit the same response. Changes in information and communication interact with underlying control to produce mutable gender-specific outcomes. Communicating with their wives at the moment of decision making makes the majority of men put money into their spouse’s account, rather than consume or put it into their own account, when compared to a condition of public information.

1. **Mine, yours or ours? The efficiency of hh investment decisions: An Experimental Approach by Anandi Mani (2011)**

* Hh max either a common set of preferences (unitary) or a weight sum of individual preferences (collective). Since members in a family interact over long periods of time in a stable environment, they are aware of each other’s preferences. However, repeated games could have several possible equilibria and it is possible for a decision not to be pareto efficient.
* Aim is to quantify the impact of two key factors on the efficiency of individual investment decisions: individual preferences for control over the hh incomes that individual members have and the role of information available to them about each others options and actions
* The experiment was conducted in Anantapur district of India in 2005 with the sample consisting of 300 hh.
* Participants’ tasks involved making investment decisions. They were given an initial sum of Rs. 50 to be allocated as they wished across two investment options - red and blue. Red yielded a return of 50% and blue yielded a 100 % return. There was no uncertainty in the returns. Each investor was presented with four options which varied in their control over the hh income.
* With exogenously fixed income shares, men in our sample invested less efficiently when their wife’s assigned was larger. In other words, they were willing to undercut their own income to make sure their wife earned less. One plausible explanation for this is “identity-based preferences”; that a man should earn more than his wife.
* The mere observability of the decision (availability of information) to the other partner does not result in more family-oriented choices. This is because the survey data indicates that financial budgeting is not predominantly the domain of the wife. Hence he doesn't feel more compelled to be efficient when she has access to information. The author concludes that inefficiencies in spouses’ choices were not driven by an inability to communicate with their partners.

1. **Battle of the Sexes: How Sex Ratios Affect Female Bargaining Power**

* Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002), developed a collective model of efficient intrahousehold bargaining and treat the sex ratio as an exogenous “distribution factor” affecting the relative bargaining power of females and the ensuing distribution of gains from marriage. If women are scarce, their weight in the decision process increases.
* Exogenous variation exists because the one-child policy in China does not apply to all ethnic groups and the stringency of fertility regulation is a determinant of local sex ratios
* Our approach is to randomly sample households in counties with high and low shares of ethnic minorities and compare the bargaining power of the spouses across such localities. If female scarcity empowers women, then women should have more bargaining power in areas where the share of ethnic minorities is relatively low.
* We collected data in 16 villages in two counties: Lipu county 156 couples and Quanzhou county 146 couples. The share of ethnic minorities in Lipu is 19.8%, and in Quanzhou it is 4.7%. This variation may translate into divergent sex ratios
* We visited randomly selected couples at their house, physically separated the spouses, and asked both of them to indicate how the power regarding decisions around the house was split between the partners in “tenths” of total decision power.
* Our second measure of bargaining power is more objective: we asked which of the spouses is in charge of handling financial issues in the household.
* Our third measure of bargaining power involves an artefactual field experiment. We played simple allocation games with the spouses separately and collectively. We first took our respondents to separate rooms, provided each of them with a separate endowment of ¥100 but did not inform them that their spouse received the same amount, and asked them to divide the ¥100 between the household and a public good. After that, the couple was brought together and given a joint endowment of ¥100. We then asked the couple to collectively divide this joint endowment between the household and a public good.
* The results suggest a positive correlation between sex ratios and female bargaining power. Specifically, for cohorts born with the OCP in effect i.e., with husbands 28 years or younger, or those with high sex ratios in Quanzhou, we find that the husband’s preference is less likely to coincide with the couple’s joint choice. Moreover, and in contrast, it is more likely that the collective choice coincides with the preferences of the wife

1. **Household decision-making and its association with intimate partner violence: Examining differences in men's and women's perceptions in Uganda (2019)**

* Comprising physical, emotional and sexual abuse by a cur- rent or previous intimate partner (Fulu & Heise, 2015), IPV typically occurs on an on-going basis rather than as an isolated episode, and women affected often experience more than one form of violence (García et al., 2005).
* While other indicators of women's empowerment such as household earnings are important, decision-making enables understanding of who has control over how those earnings are spent, and thus the power dynamics within couples that may influence access to other indicators of empowerment. It thus provides insight into the extent to which women are able to exercise choice and control
* Women who make household decisions could be at greater risk of IPV if their spouse perceives their household dominance diminishing or that this reflects their inability to fulfil their socially prescribed household gender role. women's household decision-making is more likely to be associated with an increase in IPV in societies where mas- culinities are associated with male dominance and control over women, and where traditional gender roles prevail
* Feminist theorists argue that increasing women's empowerment reduces IPV.
* Numerous studies have found that households in which decisions are made jointly have a lower probability of IPV, compared to households in which ei- ther the husband or wife dominate decision-making
* For this analysis on Ugandan Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data, we use a categorical variable to analyse decision-making by domain. not all decision-making domains can be extrapolated to women's empowerment, since some may reinforce traditional gender roles.
* The dependent variable in our analysis was physical violence within the past 12 months
* Our results found that the association between decision making and women's likelihood of experiencing IPV depended on the decision-making domain and also on who reported household decision making.
* There is a reported decrease in probability of IPV when using men's self-reported data in the domains of large household purchases and husband's earnings. The evidence of an association only for men's views on decision- making suggests men's perceptions of who makes decisions may be a more important predictor of IPV than women's perceptions
* When men report women solely make the decisions, the reduction in the probability of experiencing IPV is greater than when they report decisions are made jointly. This finding could be explained when linking to gender norms at the societal level. Perhaps men who are willing to report they involve women in decision-making do not see it as a threat, and their acceptance of household gender equality is more pronounced when they perceive they are involving women as the sole decision-maker compared to jointly.
* Further, exposure to violence as a child through witnessing a father beating a mother also predicted experience to IPV as per the individual level within the ecological framework.

1. **Women's autonomy in household decision-making: a demographic study in Nepal (2010)**

* Women's autonomy in health-care decision- making is extremely important for better maternal and child health outcomes
* Evidence from other developing countries show that women's age and family structure are the strongest determinants of women's authority in decision making. Older women and women in nuclear households are more likely than other women to participate in family decisions.
* Women have little autonomy in many cultures, so it is important to get a better understanding of the determinants of their decision-making autonomy; and variations across regions and socio-cultural contexts in the same country.
* This study is secondary analysis based on the 2006 Nepal DHS data. The DHS conducted a nationally repre- sentative survey of 10,793 women aged 15-49 and 4,397 men aged 15-59; in total 8,257 married women were interviewed about their roles in decision-making.
* In Nepal, community norms and values affect individual behaviour, so women's age, employment (in the past 12 months), number of living children, residence type (urban or rural), ecological zone (Terai, hill or mountain) and development region were considered as socio-demographic variables. Wealth is described in DHS data by an asset score. These asset scores are used to classify women into quintile groups according to the relative wealth of their household. Similarly, women's education has been consistently related to use of maternal and child health services.
* The original DHS questionnaire asked about four areas of women's autonomy in decision making. These are own health care, making major household purchases, making purchases for daily household needs and visits to her family or friends.
* Our multivariate regression explores whether socio-background characteristics are independently asso- ciated with women's autonomy in decision making.
* Increased age, paid employment and having a greater number of living children are all positively associated with women's autonomy in decision making in all four outcomes. Women with more schooling (SLC and above) are more likely to be autonomous in own health care

1. **Women’s participation in household decision-making and higher dietary diversity: findings from nationally representative data from Ghana (2016)**

* Starchy staple foods dominate the diets, with fruits, vegetables, and animal source foods scarcely consumed. This places the population at high risk of micronutrient deficiencies, and women of reproductive age are particularly vulnerable
* This may result in infants who are small for gesta- tional age and children with stunted growth and slowed cognitive development, which may persist into adulthood and transmit to the next generation
* This analysis used data from the Ghana Demographic and Health Survey. The surveys were conducted in Ghana in 2008 (September to November)
* The women’s DD score was constructed based on the 24-h recall of food consumption. The DD score is a count of the number of food groups consumed by the woman during the 24 h prior to the in-home survey.
* A “yes” response was scored “1” and “no” response scored “0”. The scores were then summed up to create the women DD score, which ranged from 0 to 9. This score was dichotomised into consumption of four or less food groups (DD ≤4)—lower DD, and consumption of five or more food groups (DD ≥5)—higher DD
* women decision- making autonomy regarding household purchases was significantly associated with higher DD (consumption of five or more food groups), after adjusting for individual and household level covariates.
* Household wealth index, education, and the absence of co-wives in the household are also positively and significantly associated with higher women’s DD.

1. **Are Women Really Better Borrowers in Microfinance? Evidence from Matrilineal and Patrilineal Societies in India**

* This study examines whether social context and norms can lead to gender differences in behavior among microfinance borrowers
* The two societies have the same genetic background, religion and primary occupation but they differ regarding social and gender norms
* Karbis are a patrilineal society while the Khasis are a matrilineal society
* 368 subjects in total (184 male, 184 female) participated in the experiment
* Subjects received either an individual or a group liability loan and  
  decided independently to invest between projects X and Y. If the project fails, then subjects cannot repay the loan. If project is successful, subjects decide to repay loan or default strategically
* For group liability loans, two subjects of the same gender and society are randomly matched and make the same decisions in the experiment. If one group member defaults, the other must repay the entire group loan to continue receiving loans in future rounds in the experiment
* In patrilineal society women are better credit risks (conventional wisdom). But the pattern reverses in matrilineal society (new insight)
* Matrilineal women are more likely to invest in risky projects and default strategically more than patrilineal women
* Patrilineal women are significantly more risk-averse than patrilineal men, but this gender gap disappears in the matrilineal society

1. **Bargaining over Risk The Impact of Decision Power on Household Portfolios (2016)**
2. **Female Empowerment and Intra-Household Nutritional Status in Rural Bangladesh**
3. **Women in household decision-making and implications for dietary quality in Bhutan (2020)**